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CREDIT BIDDING AND THE DESIGN
OF BANKRUPTCY AUCTIONS
Vincent S. J. Buccola andAshley C. Keller-

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 11 filings are commonly referred to as reorganizations.' But
most recent, large-scale Chapter 1 Is do not comfortably wear that label.
Gone are the days of the financially distressed railroads, the assets of
which-primarily long stretches of track-were too valuable conjoined to
be sold piecemeal, and yet too expensive for capital-constrained buyers to
purchase in toto. Today, some 56 percent of debtors with any value to speak
of essentially sell all of their assets. 2 Even in bankruptcies where an economically viable firm needs rescue from a debt-laden balance sheet, there is
little reason to believe-in an era when multibillion-dollar financings are
ho-hum-that an arm's length buyer will be unable to locate the capital to
purchase the entire firm.3
In high-stakes cases, bankruptcy judges now serve primarily as auctioneers. The question remains how they should structure the auctions over
which they preside.' When answering that query, courts ought to pay heed
to an overarching and, we hope, uncontroversial premise: the principal object of every bankruptcy is to maximize recoveries to the debtor's claimants.' A logical corollary to this foundational rule is that the goal of every
bankruptcy sale is to attract the highest price for the debtor's assets while
Associate, Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP.
Associate, Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP. The authors wish to thank Douglas
Baird, William Baude, Ilya Beylin, Samuel Bray, Steve Buccola, Jeff Dutson, Bradley Feingerts, Nevin
Gewertz, Thomas Gorman, JB Heaton, Isaac Lidsky, Jonathan Mitchell, Ed Morrison, Adam Mortara,
and Richard Posner for their helpful criticism of earlier drafts.
1 E.g., Nevin M. Gewertz, Comment, Act or Asset? Multiplicitous Indictments Under the Bankruptcy FraudStatute, 18 USC § 152, 76 U. CHi. L. REV. 909, 929 (2009).
2 Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Reply, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV.
673, 675-76 (2003) (finding that 56 percent of Chapter 11 proceedings in 2002 involved sales of assets).
3 See, e.g., Bay Harbour Mgmt., L.C. v. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc.), 415 B.R. 77, 80, 86 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (affirming the sale of virtually all of Lehman
Brothers' assets to Barclays Capital for $1.7 billion); Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 676 (describing how Berkshire Hathaway bought Fruit of the Loom for $800 million after Fruit of the Loom filed for
Chapter 11).
4 Douglas G. Baird, Car Trouble 2 (May 7, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db-name=ALEA20O0&paper id=9.
5 See, e.g., Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991) (stating that the general policy of the
Bankruptcy Code is to "maximiz[e] the value of the bankruptcy estate").
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minimizing the transaction costs associated with the auction.' Against the
backdrop of prevailing bankruptcy practice, credit bidding, we argue, stands
out as an especially effective tool to achieve those twin aims.
Credit bidding permits a secured creditor to bid up to the face value of
its loan as consideration for the assets a bankrupt debtor proposes to sell.' It
is a tool well-calibrated to maximize the value of a bankruptcy estate for
several reasons. First, credit bidding increases the often small pool of bidders sufficiently familiar with the debtor's assets to buy them on a truncated
timetable.! Second, it constrains debtors from favoring "white knight"' buyers who do not offer the highest purchase price. Third, credit bidding reduces the cost to submit a bid and minimizes transaction costs in general.o
As we show in Part IV, encouraging potential bidders to become actual
bidders is an unmitigated good for an estate. All of this is but to say that
credit bidding should augment, and cannot depress, the net recovery to the
debtor's creditors-and this on no small scale. Given the number of large,
complex bankruptcy sales, the decision whether to authorize credit bidding
likely holds tens of billions of dollars in the balance.
Until very recently, the value inherent in credit bidding was not in
jeopardy, as bankruptcy courts had virtually no authority to enjoin the practice." Most debtors have elected to pursue bankruptcy sales through § 363
of the Bankruptcy Code, which textually assures the right to credit bid save
"for cause." 2 Yet a debtor minded to circumvent the credit-bidding guaran6 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182, 185 (Del.
1986) (holding that the directors of Revlon's board had a duty to maximize shareholder profit at a bankruptcy sale).
7 See Freedom Mortg. Corp. v. Burnham Mortg., Inc., 569 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2009).
8 See generally United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 211 v. Family Snacks, Inc. (In
re Family Snacks, Inc.), 257 B.R. 884, 897 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001) (stating that asset sales usually occur
on an "expedited basis"); Robert E. Steinberg, The Seven Deadly Sins in § 363 Sales, AM. BANKR. INST.
J., June 2005, at 22, 22 (describing how a sale may occur within two or three months after the initial
bankruptcy filing).
9 Gandal v. Telemundo Grp., Inc., 997 F.2d 1561, 1562 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (describing a "white knight" as a buyer sought after to maximize shareholders' value
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 711 (7th Cir.
1986) (defining a "white knight" as "a buyer acceptable to the board" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
10 Baird, supra note 4 (manuscript at 15) (stating that credit bidding enables secured creditors to
bid up to the amount of their claim and avoid the transaction costs of obtaining a day loan).
11 See, e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cal. Hancock, Inc. (In re Cal. Hancock, Inc.), 88
B.R. 226, 230-31 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a nonrecourse creditor has the right to credit bid
in a sale pursuant to a reorganization plan); In re 222 Liberty Assocs., 108 B.R. 971, 978 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1990) (stating that the Bankruptcy Code protects the creditor for the full amount of its claim through
the right to credit bid at sale); In re Woodridge N. Apts., Ltd., 71 BR. 189, 190 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987)
(holding that the "sale exception" to 11 U.S.C. § Il ll(b)(1)(A) does not apply to a sale that forbids
credit bidding (internal quotation marks omitted)).
12 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2006).
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tee of § 363 has another statutory avenue to effect a sale of substantially all
of its assets: a plan of reorganization under § 1129." To approve an 1129
sale over the objection of secured creditors who wish to credit bid, the
debtor must provide the "indubitable equivalent" 4 of their secured claims
as part of a plan that is "fair and equitable."" By its terms, the text of
§ 1129 does not expressly afford secured creditors the right to credit bid for
their collateral.
Latching onto the textual distinction between § 363 and § 1129, two
recent bankruptcy decisions concluded that secured creditors do not have
the right to credit bid in sales pursuant to § 1129. In re Pacific Lumber
Co." and In re PhiladelphiaNewspapers, LLC" both invoked the supposedly plain meaning of the statutory provision, as juxtaposed with the text of
§ 363, to prohibit secured creditors with a security interest in substantially
all of the debtors' assets from bidding on credit." The upshot of these decisions is that every would-be buyer of a debtor's assets must come to the
auction house with cash."' The potential ramifications of these path-marking
opinions have sent shockwaves through the bankruptcy and distressedinvesting communities. Debtors now retain an easy statutory tool to prevent
an auction procedure that can benefit a debtor's claimants yet do the debtors
no harm. If a debtor wishes to prohibit credit bidding, it can simply initiate
a sale under § 1129 rather than-as it typically would have in years past§ 363.20 In each case standing alone, the decision to prohibit credit bidding
was a several-hundred-million-dollar mistake. If the logic of Pacific Lumber and PhiladelphiaNewspapers persuades other courts to disallow credit
bidding, the decisions will prove even more costly.
This Essay contends that Pacific Lumber and PhiladelphiaNewspapers were wrongly decided as a matter of both law and policy. The text of
§ 1129 does not compel credit bidding, as those decisions correctly saw; but
neither does it forbid it, leaving the matter to the sound discretion of the
bankruptcy court. We argue that because credit bidding can only maximize
the value of the estate where a creditor class holds a security interest in all
13 Id. I129.
1
14 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
1 Id.§ 1129(b)(1).
16 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).
17 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010).
18 Id. at 309-11; Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245-47.
19 Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 301-02 (affirming the district court's approval of bid procedures that required all qualified bidders to fund any purchase with cash); Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 246
(stating that the option to credit bid was unnecessary when the reorganization plan offered a cash payment to the claimants).
20 See Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 319 (Ambro, J., dissenting) ("Although few in the first 30
years of Bankruptcy Code jurisprudence read it that way, the majority today holds that II U.S.C.
§ I129(b)(2)(A)(ii) is not the exclusive method through which a debtor can cram down a plan calling for
the sale of collateral free of liens.").

HeinOnline -- 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 101 2010-2011

GEo. MASON L. REV.

102

[VOL. 18:1

of a debtor's assets that are up for sale, it should always amount to an abuse
of discretion for a bankruptcy court to forbid the procedure in those situations.
Part I of this Essay briefly reviews the economic rationale behind
credit bidding. Part 1I succinctly canvasses the two provisions of the Code,
§ 363 and § 1129, which empower a debtor to sell assets in bankruptcy. Part
III recounts the facts and holdings in Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia
Newspapers. Part IV demonstrates that the text of § 1129, by itself or
viewed alongside § 363, is compatible with credit bidding, while sound
bankruptcy policy limits a court's discretion to bar the procedure in most
cases.
I.

CREDIT BIDDING OVERVIEW

Aptly named, credit bidding involves a secured creditor bidding for a
debtor's assets with credit. The debtor owes the creditor a specified sum of
money-the credit-and the creditor seeks to buy the asset by extinguishing some or all of that outstanding liability. Ignoring transaction costs, a
winning credit bid should exactly match the results that would obtain if the
secured creditor bid entirely with cash. To see that this is so, suppose a debtor
owes its lone creditor $1,000 secured by the debtor's only asset, which the
debtor intends to sell at auction. Under cash-basis bidding, the creditor could
borrow $1,000 cash from the Bank and bid it on the asset. Assuming $1,000
were the winning bid, the creditor would remit the borrowed funds to the
debtor while the debtor would transfer its asset to the creditor. The debtor
would then tender $1,000 to the creditor as repayment for the secured loan
(after all, the creditor's collateral sold for $1,000, and as a secured party, he is
entitled to the proceeds of the sale). The creditor would then repay the shortlived $1,000 loan to the Bank. Netting out the transactions, the creditor
retains the asset without a corresponding liability, while the debtor discharges his obligation to the creditor. The logic of credit bidding is that it
avoids such senseless shuffling of funds from the Bank to the creditor to the
debtor to the creditor back to the Bank. If the asset is worth less than the
face amount of the creditor's secured claim, the creditor should be able to
purchase it entirely with credit.
That intuitive result comports with the nature of the creditor's property
interest. As a secured party, the creditor is not in the position of a mere obligee, relying on the debtor's promise to repay the $1,000 it borrowed. The
creditor instead retains a security interest, which is "an interest in [the
debtor's asset] which secures payment or performance of [the debtor's]
obligation." 2 1 In essence, the creditor's property interest assures either that
the debtor will repay in full or that the creditor may sell his collateral and
21

U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2006).
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retain the proceeds up to the full amount of his claim. 22 Put differently,
where the debtor's asset is worth less than the face amount of the creditor's
claim-$1,000 in our hypothetical-the creditor owns the asset outright.
Though bankruptcy prohibits the creditor from exercising some of its property rights,24 it does not frustrate the creditor's ownership in the property
itself.25 Credit bidding can therefore be recast as simply a logical recognition of the creditor's property interest.26 By enabling a creditor to bid up to
the face amount of his claim in a bankruptcy sale, credit bidding assures
merely that the creditor need not pay himself cash for his own property.
Of course, the example above is highly stylized, and ever more complex iterations of the hypothetical are possible. Yet the basic ground rule for
all manner of credit bidding is the same: the procedure should mimic the
results of an all-cash transaction. To confirm the point with a slightly more
complicated twist on the prior illustration, suppose the debtor owes secured
creditors X and Y $1,000 each, with the loans secured by the debtor's only
asset. As above, the debtor proposes to sell its property at auction. If only X
cares to bid $1,000 on the asset, can he bid with credit, and if so, how
much? The answers are yes and $500. If X's $1,000 winning bid were all
cash, X would receive the asset and $500, while Y would receive $500."
X's net cash outlay would therefore be $500. It follows that X should be
able to bid $1,000 for the debtor's asset with $500 cash and $500 credit. Or
stated more generically, if X holds 50 percent of the total tranche of secured
debt, X's bid can be composed of at most 50 percent credit. The rest of X's
bid must come in cash. As above, this result respects X's property interest
in the collateral. As one of two secured creditors with identical claims, X
retains a 50 percent property interest in the debtor's asset. X should not
have to pay himself for his own stake, but to own the asset outright, he must
buy out Y's 50 percent share. A blended bid of 50 percent cash and 50 percent credit accomplishes precisely that.
22 Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 331 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
23 For those familiar with derivatives, a secured creditor's economic interest can be expressed in
terms of an option strategy. The holder of a security interest is simultaneously long a call option on the
value of the collateral with a strike price of zero and short a call on the value of the collateral with a
strike price equal to the face amount of the loan.
24 For instance, the automatic stay prevents the creditor from repossessing his collateral. See II
U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
25 See Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, A Secured Creditor's Rights to Intellectual Property Licensed by a Debtor in Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2001, at 24, 24 (stating that a
security interest is equal to a property interest and the termination of an automatic stay does not eradicate this property interest).
26 See Steinberg, supra note 8, at 22 (defining credit bidding as "tak[ing] an ownership interest in
the company by bidding a reduction in the debt the company owes").
27 X and Y are each owed $1,000, for a total debt of $2,000. That entitles each of them to
$1,000/$2,000 or 50% of the proceeds from any winning bid of $2,000 or less. Thus, if the asset sells for
$1,000, X and Y are each entitled to $500.
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The rules and intuition governing our simple hypotheticals can be expressed more generally. Suppose a debtor owes D to its single class of
creditors. If a non-creditor wins an auction for the debtor's assets, he pays
the estate P in cash. The creditors' recovery is expressed by min {D, P}; that
is, the creditors receive the full face amount of their debt D if P > D, with
the residual P - D paid to the shareholders, and the entire purchase price P
if P < D, with nothing left over for the shareholders. Consider now any one
creditor in the class that holds a percent of the debtor's total debt D. That
creditor's recovery is min {aD, aP}, while the other creditors
share min {(1 - a)D, (1 - a)P}. If P > D, the a creditor recovers aD, the
other creditors receive (1 - a)D, and the shareholders still receive P - D.
Where P < D, the a creditor is entitled to aP, the remaining creditors divide
(1 - a)P, and the shareholders receive nothing.28
Credit bidding simply authorizes creditors to bid their respective recoveries along with any residual amount in cash. The justification for the
procedure is that all of a debtor's claimants, in all states of the world,
should be indifferent among receiving their share of the sale proceeds from
an outside bidder, from the creditor class as a whole, or from the creditbidding a creditor.2 9 Shareholders should be content to allow credit bidding
because they receive P - D in cash whenever P > D, just as they would if an
outside bidder paid P in cash. If P > D and the credit-bidding creditor class
buys the assets, it pays D with credit and P - D (the shareholder recovery)
in cash. Similarly, shareholders and non-bidding creditors should not be
averse to an a credit bidder because they receive P - D and (1 - a)D, their
respective cash shares whenever P > D. The a credit bidder pays aD on
credit (the amount it is entitled to where P > D) and P - aD in cash, of which
P - D goes to shareholders and (1 - a)D to the other creditors [P - aD = P D + D - aD = (P - D) + (1 - a)D]. If P < D, the credit-bidding class would

pay P entirely on credit to purchase the assets. The shareholders receive no
recovery, just as they would if an outside bidder paid cash. An a credit bidder
pays aP on credit and P - aP or, factoring out the P, (1 - a)P in cash to the
remaining creditors. Because the cash recoveries to the non-credit bidding
parties precisely match the cash recoveries they would receive if the assets
were sold to an outsider, credit and cash bidding should be treated identically. Said differently, bankruptcy courts should treat the credit portion of a
creditor's bid the same as cash.

28 Although this Essay focuses on credit bidding as a right that the Bankruptcy Code affords to
secured creditors, our model illustrates that the economic principles justifying credit bidding apply to
general creditors as well.
29 See generally In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 332-33 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the purpose of credit bidding is to maximize recovery at sale by protecting
creditors from an undervaluation of assets sold).
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CREDIT BIDDING UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

Corporate debtors wanting to sell themselves after filing for bankruptcy protection have two statutory routes (apart from a Chapter 7 liquidation): an asset sale under § 363, which governs the extraordinary use of
property during the administration of a bankruptcy case;30 and confirmation,
under § 1129, of a plan that contemplates an auction as the means of reorganization. 3' Because the debtor can accomplish the same end through either means, one naturally wonders why it would prefer to try to confirm a
plan, languishing in bankruptcy as its assets deplete day by day, over a
quick asset sale. The short answer is that the text of § 1129 differs from that
of § 363. The debtor may perceive a legal advantage to auctioning itself
through a plan of reorganization that offsets the cost of delay. One major
difference between the sections is the textual treatment of credit bidding.
This Part briefly describes each provision.
A.

AdministrativePowers Under § 363: Use, Sale, and Lease ofProperty

In recent years, debtors have increasingly used § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code to effect asset sales within Chapter 113 This section permits a
trustee, and therefore a debtor-in-possession, to "use, sell, or lease, other
than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate."33 Aside from
the other benefits that bankruptcy can provide, such sales have the advantage of allowing the debtor to sell its assets free and clear of liens.34 In a
typical case, the debtor enters Chapter 11, takes advantage of Code provisions that protect the company while it readies itself for sale," and then
conducts an auction under § 363.
One of the restrictions the Code imposes on § 363 sales, however, is
the requirement that secured creditors be able to credit bid. 6 Section 363(k)
provides:

30 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006).
3 Id. § 1129.
32 E.g., Contrarian Funds LLC v. Aretex LLC (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231, 23637 (2d Cir. 2010); Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448,
453 (3d Cir. 2006); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 211 v. Family Snacks, Inc. (In re
Family Snacks, Inc.), 257 B.R. 884, 887 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001).
3 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1).
34 See id. § 363(f).
35 See id. § 362(a)(i)-(8).
36 Id § 363(k). A "secured claim," it is important to recall, is not the same as the face value of
debt owed to a secured creditor; the debt is secured only to the extent of the value of the collateral. See
id. § 506(a)(1) ("An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an
interest .. . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest
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At a sale under subsection (b) of this section of property that is subject to a lien that secures
an allowed claim, unless the court for cause orders otherwise the holder of such claim may
bid at such sale, and, if the holder of such claim purchases 37such property, such holder may
offset such claim against the purchase price of such property.

This provision tends to increase the value of the estate by increasing the
number of knowledgeable bidders with quick access to credit-based currency that is equivalent to cash, as Part I shows. As we demonstrate in detail in Part IV, more bidders means a higher selling price or, in other words,
a greater recovery for the debtor's claimants.
An "undersecured" creditor" has bifurcated claims, part secured and
part unsecured, and the text of § 363 guarantees only the right to bid the
secured portion." Bifurcation creates an apparent circularity because one of
the functions of a bankruptcy sale is to determine the value of the collateral,
which is to say the secured claim, and yet the extent of the secured claim
must be a preexisting, known quantity if it is to limit the amount of credit
that can be bid at auction.4 The only answer is to say that § 5 0 6 ,41 which
governs bifurcated claims, permits the court to estimate the collateral's
value, fixing the extent of the secured claim by judicial valuation.42 Recognizing, however, that the best way to measure the value of the collateral is
through auction itself, courts have interpreted § 363 to permit credit bidding
of the entire face value of a secured creditor's credit, notwithstanding a
preexisting estimate.43
The better-reasoned legal position is that, although the Code's text
does not assure a creditor the right to bid the full face value of its credit, it
in such property ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest . .
is less than the amount of such allowed claim.").
37 Id. § 363(k).
38 An undersecured creditor is one whose claim is worth more than the value of the collateral.
Rosemary Williams, Annotation, Special Commentary: Bifurcation and Avoidance, or "Stripping," of
Liens, Security Interests, and Encumbrances Held by Undersecured Creditors by Rehabilitating and
LiquidatingDebtors in Bankruptcy, 158 A.L.R. FED. 1, 32 (1999).
39 11 U.S.C. §363(k).
40

See generally 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

3012.01, at 3012-3 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.

Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2010) ("In order to determine the value of a secured claim, the court must
determine the value of the collateral securing the claim.").
41 11 U.S.C. § 506.
42 Id. § 506(a)(1); see also Rosemary Williams, Annotation, Time and Method of Valuation Under
11 USCS § 506, of Security Held by Creditorof Bankruptcy Estate, 134 A.L.R. FED. 439, 452-53, 47980(1996).
43 E.g., Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 459 (3d
Cir. 2006) (explaining that § 363(k) "empowers creditors to bid the total face value of their claims").
Although in our view the Code's text is explicit that an undersecured creditor need only be allowed to
bid the value of its secured claim, the SubMicron decision rests on sound economic theory. Judicial
valuation should be reserved for bonafide reorganizations and sales where secured creditors do not have
a security interest in all of the assets on the block and hence cannot claim priority over any goingconcern value.
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would be an abuse of discretion for a judge to value a claim under § 506
beneath the price set in a market-based auction." Thus, pre-auction judicial
valuation is acceptable (necessary, in fact) for a true restructuring or an
auction where the creditors are not entitled to any going-concern value generated by the sale. In those situations, the credit bidder will be limited to
bidding the judicial valuation of its claim. Arguably, where the credit bidder holds a security interest in all of the assets up for sale, the judge should
value the collateral by the sale itself and thus would have no discretion to
inhibit the credit bidder from bidding the full face amount of its debt.
Despite the advantages of credit bidding, a debtor may nevertheless
prefer an auction in which bidders must come to the table with cash in
hand. The debtor might have a preferred buyer in mind, a buyer who, for
example, plans to use the assets sympathetically to the cause of the debtor's
own management. Think of a prospective buyer who wants to keep the assets together as a going concern rather than break them up and sell the
parts. It could be that the assets do not realize their highest value in the
hands of such a "white knight," and yet some of the debtor's stakeholdersperhaps especially the management that proposes the asset sale-could
benefit. The problem is a standard one of agency: owners want their assets
put to the highest value; managers want to ensure their compensation.
Aligning these interests is particularly difficult in the context of a bankruptcy because the dissolution of assets-which may well maximize the
debtor's value-inevitably means unemployment for the managers.
B.

Reorganization Under § 1129: Confirmation of the Plan

For debtors hoping to avoid credit bids, there is an alternative to a

§ 363 sale. The debtor can propose to sell all of its assets under a plan of
reorganization-under, that is, a plan confirmed by the bankruptcy court
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1129.45 The requirements of § 363 do not apply to
such a plan," at least not directly, so a debtor may be able to avoid the
credit-bid restriction if it can convince the bankruptcy court to confirm an
auction plan that bars credit bidding.
Typically, of course, the bankruptcy court will not confirm a plan unless each class of claimant accepts it or the plan pays each objecting class

44 See generally Highland Fed. Bank v. Maynard (In re Maynard), 264 B.R. 209, 213 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2001).
45 Any doubt that the heart of a plan of reorganization can be an asset sale is dispelled by II
U.S.C. § I123(a)(5)(D), which authorizes the "sale of all or any part of the property of the estate, either
subject to or free of any lien, or the distribution of all or any part of the property of the estate among
those having an interest in such property of the estate."
46 See In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., No. 09-10235 (BLS), 2010 WL 2403793, slip op. at
*10 (Bankr. D. Del. June 11, 2010).
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everything owed, whether or not the class agrees.47 An auction plan to
which no class objects poses no problem, whether or not the plan permits
credit bidding.
The interesting question arises when a plan proponent, typically the
debtor, attempts to "cram down" an auction plan that forbids secured creditors from credit bidding. The cram-down provision-i U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)-permits bankruptcy judges to confirm a plan of reorganization
"if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with
respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has
not accepted, the plan."48 As nebulous as the concepts of fairness and equity
are, application of the § 1129(b) standard generally lies within the sound
discretion of the bankruptcy judge.4 9 The Code does, however, provide
some guidance. Under § 1129(b)(2)(A), a plan is "fair and equitable" only
if, among other unspecified requirements, it protects secured claimants by
(i) leaving liens intact, (ii) permitting them to credit bid as under a § 363
sale, or (iii) giving them the "indubitable equivalent" of their secured
claims.so
In other words, for a plan to clothe the bankruptcy judge with discretion to cram down, it must provide secured creditors with one of the three
guarantees enumerated in subsections 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). Alternative (i)
is unlikely to appeal to a debtor trying to sell all of its assets because buyers
do not want to risk having to redeem preexisting liens if the debtor fails to
pay off the secured creditors in full. As a consequence, an auction plan
needs to either set forth procedures consistent with § 363-in other words,
permit credit bidding-or provide secured creditors with "the indubitable
equivalent"' of their secured claims.

See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8).
Id § 1129(b)(1); see also Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down
Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 140-41 (1979).
49 See In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 172 (7th Cir. 1992).
50 A plan is not confirmable through cram down unless it meets the following requirements:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides(i)(1) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such claim deferred cash
payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective
date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in such
property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is subject to the
liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this
subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such claims.
11 U.S.C. § I I29(b)(2)(A).
51 Congress borrowed this surprising statutory phrase from an opinion by Judge Learned Hand
construing the old Bankruptcy Act. See In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935).
47
48
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Chapter lI's auction provisions essentially boil down to this: a debtor
can auction its assets free and clear of secured creditors' security interests
through a 363 sale, effected either within bankruptcy or through a plan of
reorganization, or it can propose a plan with sale procedures that provide
the secured creditors "the indubitable equivalent" of their claims-if, to
repeat, the plan is otherwise satisfactory.
Two RECENT DECISIONS APPLYING § 1129(b)(2)

III.

At this point, it should be obvious that secured creditors (who want the
right to credit bid) and debtors (who may want to prohibit credit bidding)
are interested in the question under what conditions, if ever, an asset-sale
plan prohibiting credit bidding nevertheless supplies secured creditors with
the indubitable equivalent of their secured claims. The Third and Fifth Circuits considered this question of statutory interpretation in two recent
cases.52 Both courts held that § 1129(b) does not prevent a bankruptcy judge
from confirming a sale plan that bars credit bidding-that, in other words,
credit bidding is not a legal prerequisite to a cram down.53 Instead, the
courts reasoned, it is within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy judge to
determine that a plan provides the indubitable equivalent of the secured
claims.'
The decisions thus tackled the validity of a categorical, legal question-whether a plan proposing to sell a debtor's assets must allow secured
creditors to bid credit in order to survive a cram down-but because of the
answer that the courts reached, they also evaluated (even if only implicitly) the
respective bankruptcy judges' applications of discretion.
A.

In re Pacific Lumber Co.

In re Pacific Lumber Co. presented a dispute over the assets of six affiliated debtors who together comprised a Humboldt County-based timber
enterprise." In bankruptcy, the stakeholders ultimately came to loggerheads
over the treatment of two of the debtors: Pacific Lumber Company ("Palco") and its wholly owned special purpose entity, Scotia Pacific
LLC ("Scopac")." Palco owed approximately $160 million to its financier,
Marathon Structured Finance ("Marathon")." Palco's assets included a
52 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010); Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA
v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 242-43 (5th Cir. 2009).
53 Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 318; Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 247.
- Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 304; Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 247, 249.
55 Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 236.
56

Id. at 236.

57

id
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sawmill, a power plant, a company town, and-of primary significance to
the dispute-the equity or residual interest in Scopac and the other debtors.58 Scopac, in turn, owned some 200,000 acres of prime redwood timberland in northern California," as well as miscellaneous assets valued at
around $40 million.' Scopac was heavily indebted, however, to the tune of
about $780 million at the time of the bankruptcy petition."' Scopac owed
$740 million to the so-called "Noteholders," each of which held a secured
interest in all of Scopac's assets, and about $40 million to Bank of America,
which enjoyed a priming lien that allowed it to recover in full before the
Noteholders could take anything.62
In the course of the Chapter 11 proceedings, the bankruptcy court conducted a hearing to estimate the timberlands' value, settling finally on a
figure of $510 million.63 Although it was a creditor of Palco only, not Scopac, Marathon proposed a plan of reorganization under which it (together
with a competitor logging company called Mendocino Redwood Company)
would emerge from bankruptcy owning the reorganized debtors.' In this
proposed plan, Marathon would contribute $580 million in cash to satisfy the
other creditors. 5 Coupled with its claim against Palco, this would leave
Marathon with all of the debtors' assets.' The plan proposed to pay Bank of
America its $40 million, leaving the Noteholders with a payout roughly equal
to the value of Scopac's miscellaneous, non-timberland assets plus about
$510 million, the bankruptcy court's estimated value of the timberlands.67
The Noteholders objected to Marathon's plan, arguing that they ought
to be allowed to bid their $740 million credit for Scopac's assets." In essence, the Noteholders contended that the court's estimate undervalued the
timberlands and that with the ability to bid credit they could prove it. The
bankruptcy judge disagreed, concluding that because he had already valued
the timberlands at $510 million, a cash payment of that amount was the
indubitable equivalent of a secured claim on the asset.70 The judge allowed

58 Id. at 236 & n.2. The other debtors in this matter included Britt Lumber Company, Inc., Scotia
Inn, Inc., Salmon Creek, LLC, and Scotia Development Corp., LLC. Id. at 236 n.2.
59 Id. at 236.
60 Id. at 249 n.24, 250.
61 Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 237.
62 Id. at 237, 239.
63 Id. at 238.
64 Id. at 236-37.
65 Id. at 237.
66

Id.

67
68
69
70

Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 238-39.
Id. at 237, 239.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 238.
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Marathon to cram down its plan under § 1129(b), and the sale was perfected.'
Appealing directly to the Fifth Circuit,7 2 the Noteholders argued that
under the Code, a bankruptcy judge is not allowed to sign off on what
amounts to a going-concern sale in which the secured creditors cannot bid
with credit." As the Noteholders saw it, to hold otherwise would render
superfluous the second alternative of § 1129(b)(2)(A)-the alternative that
a plan permit credit bidding as under § 363(k)-because it would always be
easier to satisfy the indubitable-equivalent alternative.74 They contended
that because the second alternative alone refers to asset sales explicitly, it
must be satisfied to cram down any plan contemplating a sale of assets
(rather than a bonafide reorganization)."
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that § 1129(b)(2) does not prevent plan confirmation just because assets are sold free and clear of liens
without the secured creditors having the right to credit bid.76 The court recognized that the "fair and equitable" standard must be satisfied before a
court may cram down a reorganization plan. It disagreed, however, with
the Noteholders' contention that a literal interpretation of the section would
render the credit-bid alternative superfluous. Remarking that the disjunctive "or" separated the three minima of § 1129(b)(2)(A), the court rejected
the Noteholders' invitation to transform the word "or" "into an 'and.'" 79 It
was senseless, the court concluded, to argue that a cash payment equivalent
to the value of a secured claim treats the secured claimant unfairly."0 Because the bankruptcy judge had valued the Noteholders' collateral-the
timberlands-at $510 million, a cash payment in that amount was sufficient
to confirm the plan, despite the presence of a credit bidder willing to contribute a higher bid."'

71

Id. at 238-39.

72

Id. at 239.

74

Pac.Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245.
id.

75 Id.
76
7
78
79

Id. at 245-46.
Id at 244.
Id at 246.
Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245-46 (quoting Heartland Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Briscoe
Enters., Ltd., 11(In re Briscoe Enters., Ltd., II), 994 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
80 Id. at 246.
81

Id. at 248-49.
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In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC

The same legal question presented itself in In re PhiladelphiaNewspapers, LLC.12 The debtors83 in PhiladelphiaNewspapers were affiliated
entities that together owned and operated several local news publications.'
Collectively they owed about $300 million to their secured creditors ("the
lenders"), whose security interests covered substantially all of the debtors'
assets." With the benefit of Chapter 11 protection, the debtors proposed a
plan under which they would surrender their building (valued at roughly
$30 million) and turn over the cash proceeds of a planned auction of the rest
of their assets (which would fetch an additional $36 million), for a total
recovery to the lenders, after payment of administrative claims and expenses, of $66 million. The debtors were able to project auction proceeds
with some certainty because they had already received a bid in a similar
amount from a Delaware stalking horse called, confusingly, Philly Papers,
LLC."
As it turns out, Philly Papers was not exactly an arm's-length bidder.
One of its principals, Bruce Toll, was also the chairman of Philadelphia
Media Holding, a limited liability company that doubled as, suspiciously,
the debtors' corporate parent. Another of the stakeholders in Philly Papers,
the Carpenters Pension Fund, also held equity in the holding company."
The stalking horse was thus largely composed of people with ties to the
debtors' managers-insiders, so to speak.
The lenders, needless to say, were unimpressed with the idea of Bruce
Toll exiting bankruptcy owning the very newspapers he started with,
bought on the cheap. When the debtors moved in the bankruptcy court for
authorization of their preferred auction procedures, the lenders objected.'
Notably, the proposed procedures forbade credit bidding because, as the
debtors put it, they wanted the winning bidder to be able to "write a
check."" The practical effect of the proposed procedures would have been to
assure that Philly Papers won the auction. The bankruptcy judge denied the
82 See In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010).
83 The bankruptcies of a handful of affiliates were procedurally consolidated. See Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 301 & ni.
8 Id. at 30 1.
85 id
86 Id. at 301-02; In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-l1204SR, 2009 WL 3242292, at *2
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2009), rev'd in part,418 B.R. 548 (E.D. Pa. 2009), af'd, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir.
2010).
87 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 418 B.R. 548, 554 (E.D. Pa. 2009), af'd, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir.
2010).
88 Phila. Newspapers, 2009 WL 3242292, at *10.
89 id
9
91

Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 302.
Phila. Newspapers, 2009 WL 3242292, at *11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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debtors' motion, explaining that he would only authorize an auction that
permitted the lenders to credit bid.92 He observed the apparent unseemliness
of the Philly Papers bid, or, as we might rather put it, the unlikely proposition
that it could be taken on faith, without meaningful testing, that people closely
associated with the debtors' residual owner were the highest bidders.9 3
Rather than deny the debtors' motion as a matter of discretion, however, the judge rejected their proposed plan as a matter of statutory interpretation.94 He held that the text of § 1129(b)(2)(A) barred a liquidation plan
whose auction procedures were inconsistent with § 363(k).' After all, the
court reasoned, § 1129(b)(2)(A) enumerates three ways that a plan can satisfy the "fair and equitable" cram-down requirement. 96 If an auction in
which credit bidding is forbidden could be fairly called the "indubitable
equivalent" of secured claims, there would be no reason for the statute to
list separately the alternative requirement that such a plan provide a sale
complying with § 363(k).9 ' Subsection (b)(2)(A)(iii) would totally swallow
(b)(2)(A)(ii). 98
An interlocutory appeal followed, and the district court reversed the
bankruptcy court's ruling and remanded the matter." Citing Pacific Lumber, Judge Robreno concluded that a fair auction can produce a recovery
that is the indubitable equivalent of a secured creditor's secured claim, even
without credit bidding."
A divided panel of the Third Circuit affirmed."o' Like the Fifth, the
Third Circuit focused on what it considered the plain meaning of
§ 1129(b)(2)(A). The court explained that "[t]he use of the word 'or' in this
provision operates to provide alternatives-a debtor may proceed under
subsection (i), (ii), or (iii), and need not satisfy more than one subsection."O2 Unlike Judge Ambro, whose dissent would have construed the section by reference to context and legislative history and would have held that
subsection (ii) governs every plan proposing to sell assets free and clear of
liens," the majority perceived no ambiguity in the language.

92

id

93

Id. at *5, *10-11.

Id.at *5-9.
95 Id at *5-6, *9.
96 Id at *5.
9 Phila.Newspapers, 2009 WL 3242292, at *6.
98 Id. at *5.
In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 418 B.R. 548, 552, 575 (E.D. Pa. 2009), affd, 599 F.3d 298 (3d
Cir. 2010).
94

100

Id. at 571-72.

101
102
103

In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 305.
Id. at 328 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
Id at 311 (majority opinion).

I

HeinOnline -- 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 113 2010-2011

GEO. MASON L. REV.

114

[VOL. 18:1

In combination, Pacific Lumber and PhiladelphiaNewspapers are important authority for the proposition that asset sales need not include the
credit bids of secured creditors. The Fifth Circuit did observe, to be fair,
that a confirmable plan must include one of the three alternatives under
§ 1129(b)(2)(A): "Even a plan compliant with these alternative minimum
standards is not necessarily fair and equitable."'o But the analysis stopped
there and did not consider whether credit bidding might constitute an unenumerated requirement to render confirmable a plan that proposes an asset
sale. Consequently, neither Pacific Lumber nor PhiladelphiaNewspapers
teaches anything about when credit bidding might be required, advisable,
inadvisable, or prohibited or by what principles a bankruptcy court's decision ought to be reviewed.
IV. THE CORRECT APPROACH TO RESOLVING CREDIT BID DISPUTES
UNDER § 1129(b)

The natural question, and the one toward which this Essay is directed,
is whether Pacific Lumber and PhiladelphiaNewspapers correctly applied
the Bankruptcy Code and, if not, how they ought to have done so. In sum,
our view is as follows. The Code does not by its terms require that secured
creditors have the opportunity to bid credit for a judge to cram down an
asset-sale plan. Consistent with the analysis of both the Third and Fifth
Circuits, we agree that the disjunctive "or" separating the alternative minimum requirements of § 1129(b)(2)(A) precludes treating subsection
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (the credit-bidding provision) as an addition to subsection
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (the indubitable-equivalent criterion) rather than its alternative. We think, however, that the three alternative minimum requirements are a red herring that distracted the courts from answering the ultimate question: whether approving a plan without credit bidding is an abuse
of discretion. As the Fifth Circuit recognized in Pacific Lumber, a plan's
satisfaction of § 1129(b)(2)(A) is necessary but not sufficient to justify a
cram down' -necessary, in other words, to vest the bankruptcy court with
a discretion that is itself independently reviewable.
Discretion is not unbridled. It is, as has been said, "exercised under
law,"" and a judge abuses his discretion in a bankruptcy case where he
destroys creditor recovery without justification. We argue that although
judges may cram down an auction plan excluding credit bids as a matter of
law, courts abuse their discretion where they forbid creditors with a security
105

Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.),
584 F.3d 229, 245 (5th Cir. 2009).
106

Id.

107 Ball v. City of Chi., 2 F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting In re Oil Spill by the Amoco
Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1334 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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interest in all of the assets for sale to credit bid. Such a rule would not only
harmonize with the Code's apparent preference for credit bidding,"os it
would tend to maximize the recovery to a debtor's creditors.
A.

The Code

Section 1129(b)(1) permits a bankruptcy judge to confirm a plan, including a plan under which the debtor sells its assets, only if it "does not
discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable," with respect to each objecting class of creditor.'" To be "fair and equitable," the Code explains, the
plan must include at least one of the protections for secured creditors enumerated in § 1129(b)(2)."' In practical terms, the plan must either permit
credit bidding or supply secured creditors with the "indubitable equivalent"
of their claims. A plan providing one of these protections, to put things the
other way around, may be confirmed notwithstanding a class's objection if
it otherwise "does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable.""'
The Pacific Lumber and PhiladelphiaNewspapers courts recognized,
properly as we see it, that the "indubitable equivalent" of subsection
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) is an alternative to the credit bidding contemplated by
subsection 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). To cloak the bankruptcy court with discretion
to cram down, the plan need not supply both protections. Because the Code
contemplates judicial valuation of secured claims,'12 a plan may well provide the indubitable equivalent of a claim-by, say, paying the judicially
estimated value of the security in cash, as the Pacific Lumber plan proposed
to do-without permitting credit bidding.
So far, so good. The crucial point to see, for our purposes, is that a
plan's satisfaction of the indubitable-equivalent provision does not imply
that the plan should be confirmed. It only gives the bankruptcy judge
authority to confirm the plan if it is otherwise fair."' This opaque criterion
Credit bidding can be prohibited in an asset sale under § 363, but only "for cause." II U.S.C.
(2006).
109 Id § 1129(b)(1).
110 For the list, see id. I129(b)(2)(A). We note that courts often speak of the "fair and equitable"
phrase as codifying the rule of absolute priority among creditor classes. E.g., Motorola, Inc. v. Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 462-63 (2d Cir. 2007);
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Dow Coming Corp. (In re Dow Coming Corp.), 456 F.3d
668, 672 (6th Cir. 2006); In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 512-13 (3d Cir. 2005). No
one believes, however, that the words "fair" and "equitable" are lexically synonymous with the principle
that a senior class of creditors must recover in full before its junior classes can take anything. Rather,
what courts mean when they say the absolute-priority rule is "codified" is that to violate it is never fair
and equitable-that therefore a bankruptcy judge never has discretion to cram down a plan rejecting
absolute priority. The formal similarity to our argument should be clear.
111 II U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).
112 See id.§ 506(a)(1).
113 See id.§ lI29(b)(1).
108

§ 363(k)
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of judgment must receive its meaning, if it is to have any at all, from the
purposes of plans of reorganization and of bankruptcy generally. More on
this below; for now, it suffices to observe that a world of fairness is a world
of discretion.l14
Apart from giving § 1129 what we think is its best reading, the rule
that a bankruptcy judge has discretion to cram down an asset-sale plan
without credit bidding has the happy consequence of harmonizing with
§ 363(k). That provision, recall, instructs that when a debtor-in-possession
sells property other than in the ordinary course of business, secured creditors must be allowed to bid for the assets with credit "unless the court for
cause orders otherwise.""' A bankruptcy judge enjoys discretion, in other
words, if he has reason to permit asset sales in which credit bidding is prohibited." 6
Sections 363 and 1129 offer a debtor two procedural mechanisms by
which to sell itself as a going concern-one within bankruptcy, the other
pursuant to a plan to emerge reorganized from Chapter 11. There is no reason to prefer one mechanism over the other; that is, as a general matter,
there is no reason to channel debtors toward one or the other section of the
Code. In any given case, one avenue may, of course, outshine the otherhence the choice!-but neither is superior in the abstract. A Code under
which the choice of section number determines the auction rules is, however, a Code that implicitly directs debtors one way or the other without a
good bankruptcy justification. A debtor that wishes to shape auction rules
will have a preference for the option that gives it maximum control. If
§ 363 is the likeliest choice to oust credit bidders, a debtor wanting cashonly bids is much more likely to sell assets within Chapter 11, and vice
versa if § 1129 were interpreted to give the debtor more power. But neither
the Code's text nor a sensible economic theory suggests that a debtor
should be able to manipulate the framework of an asset sale by electing one
or another section number. Put differently, there is no social benefit to allowing a debtor to gain an advantage by opting for one or the other route to
the same destination.
Our proposed reading of § 1129 overcomes the problem entirely. Under our reading, the bankruptcy judge decides one question whenever a
debtor-in-possession sells its assets-whether there is good cause, in the
114 Although the Code specifies requirements that, if not met, preclude confirmation of a plan of
reorganization, the ultimate decision to confirm is entrusted to the bankruptcy court's discretion. E.g.,
United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO, Inc.), 725 F.2d 293, 297-98 (5th Cir. 1984); see, e.g.,
Acequia, Inc. v. Clinton (In re Acequia, Inc.), 787 F.2d 1352, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986). As in other areas of
law, discretion means "a discretion exercised not arbitrarily or willfully, but with regard to what is right
and equitable under the circumstances and the law." A WECO, 725 F.2d at 298 (quoting Langnes v.
Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115 II U.S.C. § 363(k).
116 For the proposition that such a decision is discretionary, which we think is easily defended, see
Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 459 (3d Cir. 2006).
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case at hand, to prohibit credit bidding-and reviewing courts are uniformly charged to answer whether the judge's conclusion was an abuse of
discretion.
B.

Auctions, TransactionCosts, and the Scope of the Bankruptcy Court's
Discretion

Because the text and structure of § 1129 neither compel nor proscribe
credit bidding, the Code leaves the decision to authorize the procedure to
the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court. The question remains how the
court should or, one might say, must exercise that authority. To recapitulate
our opening premise, bankruptcy judges overseeing an asset sale must always exercise their discretion with an eye towards maximizing the selling
price for the debtor's assets. As we show below, credit bidding is likely to
produce an auction with more bidders and lower transaction costs, which
means higher expected returns to creditors. We thus conclude that it should
always be held an abuse of discretion for a judge to confirm a plan prohibiting credit bids, at least where a creditor's security interest reaches all the
assets up for auction.
1.

Auctions 101

Auction optimization theory is a well-developed field that studies
complicated concepts largely outside the scope of this Essay. Nonetheless,
we adumbrate here the basic and largely intuitive concepts at work in most
every auction. When a seller auctions his asset, he has in mind a selling
price-economists dub it the reservation price-below which he is unwilling to part with his property."' The seller's incentive, assuming he is profitmaximizing, is thus to sell his asset for as high a price as possible above his
reservation price."' A buyer has a reservation price as well, which is the
highest amount she is willing to pay to purchase the seller's asset."' The
profit-maximizing buyer's incentive is, unsurprisingly, the mirror image of
the seller's: acquire the asset for as much as possible below her reservation
price.'20 In a typical open ascending price auction-also referred to as an
English auction-the bidding begins at the seller's reservation price be117

Ian Steedman, Reservation Price and Reservation Demand, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A

DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 158, 158 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1998).

118

See John G. Riley & William F. Samuelson, Optimal Auctions, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 381, 382
(1981); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A
CriticalAnalysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 423,438 (1993).
119 See Riley & Samuelson, supra note 118.
120 See Steedman, supranote 117, at 158-59.
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cause he is unwilling to sell the item for less. 2 ' Would-be buyers then
openly bid against each other, with each successive bid exceeding the previous one by some preset, minimum overbid amount. The bidding continues
until no participant is willing to bid further, at which point the highest bidder "wins" the auction and purchases the asset for the amount of her final

bid.122
Under this typical auction format, it is readily apparent that a seller
benefits from increased competition between bidders. To illustrate the
point, suppose a seller is auctioning a widget. His reservation price is $100,
and the auction rules dictate that each bid must top the previous one by at
least a dollar. Two bidders, B, and B 2 , participate in the auction. B,'s reservation price is $150, while B2 'S is $250. B, starts the bidding at $100, the
minimum opening bid per the seller's reservation price, and B2 follows with
a topping bid of $101. B, then submits a bid of $102 that B 2 again exceeds
by a dollar, and so on. The bidding war between B1 and B 2 continues until
B, bids $150 and B 2 tops with a bid of $151. Because B, is not willing to
buy the widget for more than her $150 reservation price, she will not top
B2's bid. Consequently, $151 will prove the final bid, and B2 will purchase
the widget at that price.
The $99 spread between B 2 'S $151 winning bid and her $250 reservation price represents money the seller could have captured had the auction
produced increased competition between B2 and other would-be buyers. Put
differently, B2 was willing to pay $99 more than she did for the widget. She
did not do so only because the competing bidder, B,, did not force her to
bid more than the $151 purchase price. If only a third bidder, B3 , with a
reservation price of $249 had participated in the auction, the seller would
have collected $250 for the widget, the maximum amount possible given
the bidders' respective reservation prices. With B3 in the mix, all three bidders would have bid against each other until the price reached $150. At that
price level, B, would stop bidding, as before. The auction would then become a two-way contest between B 3 and B 2, with each topping the other's
offer until B3 bid $249, her reservation price. Because B 2 is willing to pay
exactly $250 for the widget, she would top B 3's bid by a dollar, "winning"
the widget for $99 more than she would have otherwise paid had B3 not
shown up at the auction house.
One can express the takeaways from this simple hypothetical generically. Where an auction requires a relatively small minimum overbid in121 Vernon L. Smith, Auctions, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra note 117. We demonstrate the
intuition behind English auctions because they are the most typical and accessible to lay readers. The
basic intuitions gleaned from the English-auction illustrations are applicable to other auction formats as
well, including competitive sealed tenders (so-called silent auctions) and declining-price auctions (also
referred to as Dutch or clock auctions). See generally id. at 138-39 (explaining sealed and decliningprice auctions).
122 Id. at 138.
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crement (in), the theoretical winning bid (w) should equal the secondhighest reservation price (r2) plus the overbid increment such that
w = r 2 + m. The intuition behind that generic prediction is not far to seek.
Economic self-interest encourages the bidder with the highest reservation
price, like all bidders, to obtain the asset for as low a price as possible.
Competition between bidders will eventually push the bid to the reservation
price of the would-be buyer with the second-highest reservation price. The
highest-value user of the asset will then top that bid by the minimum overbid amount. With no other bidders willing to pay m more for the asset, a
price of r2 + m will win the auction.'23 The perhaps surprising upshot is that
there are only two bidders who ultimately set an asset's final sale price: the
auction's winner (the bidder with the highest reservation price) and its runner up (the bidder with the second-highest reservation price).
2.

The Value of Additional Bidders

If only two bidders are responsible for the price at which an asset will
sell, one may wonder why opening the auction to all and sundry is the
seller's optimal strategy. To maximize his auction proceeds, one might
think, a seller should simply unlock the doors of the auction house to the
two bidders with the highest and the second-highest reservation prices for
the assets on the block. Yet how is a seller to identify these bidders in advance of the auction? A buyer has obvious incentives not to advertise the
top price he is willing to pay for the seller's wares. 2 4 Seeking to maximize
his sale proceeds but unable to finger the winning bidder and the runner up
pre-sale, it follows that a seller's efficient solution is to permit every bidder
with sufficient financial means to participate in the auction.'25 Bidders with
reservation prices below the second-highest reservation price, such as BI in
our hypothetical above, will neither win the auction nor increase the final
price. But nor will they depress the winning price, and thus they do the
seller no harm. Excluding an interested buyer, on the other hand, where

every bidder potentially represents the auction participant with the highest
or second-highest reservation price, creates a risk the seller has no reason to
take.
It follows that keeping a credit bidder from participating in a bankruptcy auction is an unsupportable strategy, at least for a debtor intent on
123

There are situations where this formula does not hold. For instance, if the difference between
the highest reservation price (r1) and the second-highest reservation price (r2) is less than m, it is possible for the bidder with the second-highest reservation price to win the auction with a bid between r, - m
and r2. This circumstance and others like it can be safely ignored, as they do not in any way diminish the
positive influence of additional bidders in general or credit bidding in particular on the winning bid.
124 See Ball Mem'1 Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1344 (7th Cir. 1986).
125 See David Hahn, When Bankruptcy Meets Antitrust: The Casefor Non-Cash Auctions in ConcentratedBanking Markets, II STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 28, 67 (2005).
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maximizing its sale proceeds. All else being equal, there is a non-trivial
probability that the credit bidder will be the highest or second-highest value
user of the assets that the debtor proposes to sell. Forbidding the credit bidder from credit bidding thus reduces the expected returns from the sale.
But all else may not be equal. As a secured party, the creditor wishing
to credit bid is likely more familiar with the debtor's business and assets
than are other prospective buyers.'26 Through its history of monitoring the
debtor, the credit bidder may be privy to information about the true value of
the collateral the debtor is selling that is not apparent to other would-be
bidders. If we assume that information asymmetries will generally reduce
the value an outsider is willing to pay for a debtor's assets, the credit bidder
may be the most likely party to have the highest reservation price. The secured creditor is the very bidder the debtor cannot afford to deter from bidding-at least if it does not wish to leave money on the table.
But what if it does? As the facts of PhiladelphiaNewspapers demonstrate, there is often doubt, to put it charitably, that the debtor's managers
are truly interested in maximizing the proceeds from a bankruptcy sale.
Because corporations and the people who manage them often have misaligned interests, it is hardly implausible that a debtor's officers would seek
to sell the bankrupt's business to a low-value bidder in exchange for some
personal remuneration that does not redound to the benefit of the enterprise
as a whole. Senior creditors, who bear the costs of this form of managerial
perfidy, are already incentivized to prevent inefficient sales. Credit bidding
affords them a ready tool to effectively act on that incentive. Put simply,
increasing the stock of interested bidders is a bankruptcy court's best check
against a management effort to rig the results of an auction. On the flip side,
keeping willing buyers from casting bids is the most effective means for
management to steer the debtor's assets to a favored, low-value purchaser.
As between authorizing and forbidding credit bidding, then, a bankruptcy court's decision should be all but automatic. Credit bidding increases
the number of knowledgeable bidders at the auction while serving as a
check against management malfeasance. Those benefits in themselves suggest that credit bidding is an unalloyed good. Yet credit bidding produces at
least one more benefit for a debtor's creditors that a court should consider
when deciding, in its discretion, whether to allow the procedure: reducing
transaction costs.

126

Because the value of a security interest depends on the value of the collateral, secured creditors
are often willing to bear the costs of monitoring the debtor's business in order to protect the value of
their collateral.
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Reducing Transaction Costs

As we have explained, a buyer comes to an auction with a discrete reservation price representing the maximum amount she is willing to pay for
the seller's assets. From the buyer's perspective, it is irrelevant what percentage of the ultimate purchase price ends up in the seller's pocket. To
illustrate, suppose Sotheby's is auctioning a Rembrandt and an art collector
is prepared to pay a total of $110 million to purchase the painting. If Sotheby's requires winning bidders to pay a $10 million fee, the collector will
bid no more than $100 million for the artwork.'27 For she is willing to pay a
total of only $110 million for the painting, regardless of how the auctioneer
and the owner divide the proceeds. If the Rembrandt's owner could persuade Sotheby's to lower its fee, every dollar in reduced commission would
translate into an additional dollar that the collector (and every other bidder)
would be willing to bid on the painting. The higher the bids, the greater the

owner's enrichment.128
Credit bidding has the same effect as reducing the auctioneer's commission because allowing the secured creditor to bid with credit eliminates
its costs of obtaining capital. Recall our highly stylized example from Part I
where the debtor owes a secured creditor $1,000 and the creditor wishes to
purchase the debtor's only asset. To show that credit bidding replicates the
results of an all cash deal, we sent the secured creditor to obtain a $1,000
loan from the Bank. The money was then shuffled from the Bank to the
creditor to the debtor back to the creditor all the way back to the Bank,
leaving the secured creditor with the asset and no net cash outlay. Absent
transaction costs, then, we concluded that credit and cash bidding are economic equivalents.
But an economist who assumes away transaction costs is like a physicist who assumes away friction. In the real world, transaction costs are an
actual cost of doing business. The Bank, after all, is not a charitable enterprise. If the creditor seeks a loan, even one with a short duration that is
highly secured, he will have to pay the Bank for the use of its money. The
Bank's interest and fees for the deal, like Sotheby's commission, will reduce the amount the credit bidder is willing to bid for debtor's assets on a
one-for-one basis. For the purposes of an exemplar hypothetical, we can
perhaps assume away the interest and fees on a $1,000 loan. But where the
127 We recognize that sellers sometimes pay an auctioneer's commission, but the party who foots
the bill has no bearing on the point we are making. If Sotheby's takes a piece of the action, the seller
will end up with less, irrespective of whether the collector or the seller writes the commission check. For
ease of illustration, then, we assume that the buyer must bear the transaction costs of the auction.
128 Note that the $10 million commission reduces by that amount the top bid of every bidder,
including the one with the second-highest reservation price. Though the equation w = r 2 + m still holds,
it is only by defining w as the total expenditure to purchase the painting. The proceeds to the seller (p) is
expressed by p = r 2 - $10 million + m.
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alternative to credit bidding is to require that secured creditors who wish to
bid raise $740 million dollars in cash, as in Pacific Lumber, or up to $300
million, as in Philadelphia Newspapers,129 we can no longer dismiss the
costs of securing capital. Putting together deals of those sizes, however
temporary and secure the loans, would needlessly generate millions of dollars in fees and interest,'30 all for the creditors to remit cash that the court
will return to them. Reducing, in turn, by several million dollars the size of
the creditors' recovery is no way for a bankruptcy judge to run an auction.
Objections to Allowing Credit Bidding in Bankruptcy Auctions

C.

A critic of credit bidding might offer several objections to our policy
analysis. The most common (and weakest) among them is that increasing
the number of bidders is a seller's optimal strategy only where all of the
bidders are prepared to pay with cash. Increasing the pool of potential buyers with non-cash bidders, the argument goes, is like inviting bidders to
purchase the debtor's assets with apples and oranges."' We can easily dispose of this criticism. We have already shown that credit bidding precisely

matches the results of an all-cash bid. Said differently, the value of the secured creditor's credit has a discrete and easily identified cash value. Forbidding credit bidding on the ground that credit is not cash is tantamount to
prohibiting cash bidders from bidding with two fifty-dollar bills in lieu of a
single, hundred-dollar note.
A more serious variant of this objection is that credit bidding deters
cash bidders. On this view, would-be bidders who would otherwise participate in the auction take note of the size of the debtor's liability to the secured creditors. To the extent the credit-the credit bidder's currency at
auction-eclipses a would-be bidder's actual or perceived value of the assets, that party knows that the secured creditor can easily outbid his reserva129

See In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010); Bank of N.Y. Trust Co.,
NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 237 (5th Cir.
2009).
130 For instance, when we wrote this Essay in January of 2010, the three-month LIBOR rate was at
a historically low 0.25 percent. See LIBOR Rates History, WALL ST. J. PRIME RATE,
http://www.wsjprimerate.us/libor/libor rates history.htm (last visited Sep. 5, 2010). Even at that depressed rate of interest, the secured creditors in Pacific Lumber would have incurred $1,850,000 in
interest expenses to borrow the $740 million face amount of their loan. And that figure does not include
any lender fees and other costs (such as legal expenses) that assuredly would accompany a loan of that
size.
131 See In re Homestead Partners, Ltd., 197 B.R. 706, 719 n.15 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (explaining
that allowing credit bidding in an auction would be like allowing the main competitor to bid with a
"currency of no consequence"); Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for
First Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist
Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 196 n.l 17 (2000) (stating that credit bidding undermines competition because secured creditors have an "enormous advantage over cash bidders").
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tion price. He may thus elect to forgo the auction altogether rather than
compete with the party destined to purchase the assets. If other cash bidders
make the same election, credit bidding actually reduces the number of auction participants, depressing the ultimate winning bid.13 2
This objection is unpersuasive, as there is nothing about the argument
specific to credit bidding. Instead, the argument rests on the notion that
bidders with deep pockets may deter bidders with limited resources. For
instance, if a would-be bidder knows that Warren Buffett plans to attend an
auction, she is also surely aware that Buffett can top her reservation price
for any or all of the assets on the block. Yet nobody proposes to ban
wealthy cash bidders from participating in a bankruptcy auction.
That, of course, makes good economic sense. Would-be bidders understand that a deep-pocketed player's ability to top their reservation price
does not imply a willingness to do so. Warren Buffett did not become
wealthy by overpaying for things, so it is possible, indeed, probable, that his
reservation price for an asset at auction will be beneath that of another
buyer. And buyers know this in advance. The same logic holds for secured
creditors. By bidding a particular sum on credit, the secured creditors are
eschewing the cash they would otherwise receive for any cash offer beneath
their bid. Buyers therefore know that a credit bidder will not bid all of his
credit unless he actually values the assets for that price. That the secured
creditor may have a lower reservation price should prove sufficient to attract interested cash bidders to the auction.
A final objection is that credit bidding is unnecessary because the secured creditor can always obtain a short-term loan to bid for the debtor's
assets. Banning the procedure, therefore, does not reduce the number of
bidders at auction. Let us put to one side that this rejoinder fails to account
for transaction costs, which we have already demonstrated reduce creditor
recoveries. Because credit bidding exactly mirrors the results of an all-cash
bid, it does stand to reason-assuming efficient capital markets-that secured creditors should be able to procure the financing to participate in an
auction. At first cut, then, a judge's refusal to permit the procedure may not
seem problematic.
A deeper look confirms, however, that prohibiting credit bidding is often the same as preventing the secured creditors from submitting a bid.
Most lenders would likely be willing to lend secured creditors the capital
they need to submit a bid given the short duration of the loan (the time it
takes to pass from the creditor to the debtor back to the creditor) and the
near certain prospect of getting repaid. But lenders do not hand out $740
million or $300 million casually. They require time to conduct due dili132

See, e.g., In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-ll204SR, 2009 WL 3242292, at *4 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2009) (noting that debtors argued that credit bidding should be precluded because it
would chill competitive bidding by disincentivizing other bidders from becoming involved in the sale
process), rev'd in part, 418 B.R. 548 (E.D. Pa. 2009), affd, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010).
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gence to ensure that, for instance, the secured creditor actually has a perfected security interest in all of the collateral up for sale. Where the time
between the announcement and performance of the auction can be as truncated as a matter of days,'33 secured creditors may lack the time to secure
capital. And while capital markets are generally efficient, the recent financial crisis confirms that there are periods where capital is scarce even to the
most credit-worthy borrowers. Because those times will positively correlate
with a high number of bankruptcy filings and requests to credit bid,'34 forcing secured creditors to raise cash from the market may effectively stop
them at the auction-house door.
If credit bidding is the equivalent of a cash offer, and forcing creditors
to borrow cash may prove successful but may not, there seems no reason to
prohibit the procedure on the ground that the interested credit bidder ought
to just obtain a day loan.
CONCLUSION

Now that most Chapter 11 "reorganizations" are glorified asset sales in
which the debtor uses bankruptcy to prepare itself for auction, the design of
sale procedures has become a paramount concern to bankruptcy practitioners and courts. This Essay has endeavored to show that credit bidding
tends to augment-and cannot depress-total creditor recoveries and that it
therefore should be a mandatory feature of bankruptcy auctions. This conceit is not just in keeping with sound bankruptcy policy. It is consistent with
the text of the Bankruptcy Code, which entrusts the decision to cram down
a plan to the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court. A court cannot properly exercise its discretion to design a sale without taking into account the
effect its decision will have on creditor recoveries. And because it is always
an abuse of discretion to forbid an auction device that can increase but not
lower stakeholder recoveries, we conclude that bankruptcy courts should be
obligated to permit credit bidding.

133 See supra note 8.
134 See
generally

Bankruptcy
Statistics,
U.S.
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (last visited Sep. 5, 2010) (providing
comparison tables documenting the overall increased number of bankruptcy filings in recent years).
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